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Abstract 
This chapter explores the role of metaphors in shaping our thought and language 
in general, and in the fields of law and religion in particular.  Drawing on modern 
cognitive theorists like George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the article distinguishes and 
illustrates the roles of “orientation,” “structural,” and “ontological” metaphors in everyday 
life and language.  Drawing on jurists like Robert Cover and Steven Winter, it shows 
how metaphors work both in describing the law in terms like “the body,” and in 
prescribing the foundational beliefs and values on which the legal system depends.  
Finally, the chapter explores the ample use of the sacred number three in the law, and 
speculates tentatively whether this legal appetite for “triads” might provide traction for 
the development of a Trinitarian jurisprudence.  This chapter is dedicated to Michael 
Welker, a leading German systematic theologian and Christian philosopher, who has 
helped build a strong trans-Atlantic discourse on law and religion.  
Keywords: metaphor; law and religion; George Lakoff; Robert Cover; the body of 
law; fundamental beliefs; constitutional law; triads in the law; Trinity; Trinitarian 
jurisprudence; Michael Welker; Sir Edward Coke 
Introduction 
The great English historian, Herbert Butterfield, once wrote of the habit of 
Protestants “to hold some German up their sleeves ... and at appropriate moments to 
strike the unwary Philistine on the head with this secret weapon, the German scholar 
having decided in a final manner whatever point may have been at issue.”1  Professor 
Michael Welker has been the German up my sleeve – and, increasingly, at my side -- 
for nearly two decades now, much to my delight and edification.   
 
1 Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 9. 
2 
I first met Professor Welker at a 1998 Princeton Theological Seminary 
conference on “Religion, Pluralism, and Public Life.”  There he argued strongly that, to 
be effective in public and interdisciplinary discourse, theology had to be “serious,” “truth-
seeking,” “existentially grounded,” and “comprehensible,” with a studied “competence in 
social and cultural criticism,” and a sturdy willingness to engage “the burning questions 
that our contemporary cultures and societies pose.”2  In the ensuing two decades, 
Professor Welker has embarked on a major series of brilliant interdisciplinary and 
international projects and publications that have brought theology into “serious,” and 
deep “truth-seeking” dialogue with the fields of science, cosmology, politics, law, 
philosophy, economics, media, literature, and more.  All along he has continued to pour 
out his own marvelous monographs on the doctrines of God, the Spirit, liturgy and the 
sacraments, human anthropology, the Protestant Reformation and Reformed theology, 
along with critical studies of great theologians and philosophers from Kant, Hegel, and 
Schleiermacher to Whitehead, Bonhoeffer, and Moltmann.  He has also traveled the 
world, standing at distinguished lecterns and pulpits on every Continent and having his 
work translated and celebrated in sundry Romance and Asian languages.  Here is one 
of Butterfield’s great “German scholars” for our own day.  Professor Welker has not 
pretended to “decide in a final manner” the many great questions he has engaged.  But, 
as other chapters in this volume amply attest, he has certainly helped a great deal to 
“build up trust” and “truth-seeking” dialogue across interdisciplinary, interreligious, and 
international lines. 
I have been a happy beneficiary of the law and religion dialogue that Professor 
Welker has helped to lead. I have had the privilege of collaborating with him on several 
international and interdisciplinary projects that included law and religion themes – 
human dignity and anthropology, religion and globalization, law and biblical Christianity, 
and legal concepts in the sciences, legal studies, and theology.  We have stood at each 
other’s lecterns at Heidelberg and Emory, edited, reviewed, and translated each other’s 
work, and led and participated in several roundtables together on the interaction of the 
spheres and sciences of law and religion and their “concrete applications” to the 
“burning questions” of our day. 
In the course of this collaborative work, we have come to see that the spheres 
and sciences of law and religion are conceptually related.  They both draw upon 
prevailing concepts of the nature of being and order, the person and community, 
knowledge and truth.  They both embrace closely analogous doctrines of sin and crime, 
covenant and contract, righteousness and justice.  Law and religion are 
methodologically related.  They share overlapping hermeneutical methods of 
interpreting authoritative texts, casuistic methods of converting principles to precepts, 
systematic methods of organizing their subject matters, pedagogical methods of 
transmitting the science and substance of their craft to students.  Law and religion are 
 
2 Michael Welker, “Is Theology in Public Discourse Possible Outside Communities of Faith,” in Luis Lugo, 
ed., Religion, Pluralism, and Public Life: Abraham Kuyper’s Legacy for the Twenty-First Century (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2000), 110-22. 
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institutionally related, through the multiple relationships between political and religious 
officials and the multiple institutions in which these officials serve. 
We have also come to see that law and religion are dimensions of each other.  
Every legitimate legal system has what Lon Fuller called an “inner morality,” a set of 
attributes that bespeak its justice and fairness.  Like divine laws, human laws are 
generally applicable, publicly proclaimed and known, uniform, stable, understandable, 
non-retroactive, and consistently enforced.3  Every legitimate legal system also has 
what Harold Berman called an "inner sanctity," a set of attributes that command the 
obedience, respect, and fear of both political authorities and their subjects.  Like 
religion, law has authority -- written or spoken sources, texts or oracles, which are 
considered to be decisive or obligatory in themselves.  Like religion, law has tradition -- 
a continuity of language, practice, and institutions, a theory of precedent and 
preservation.  Like religion, law has liturgy and ritual -- the ceremonial procedures, 
decorum, and words of the legislature, the courtroom, and the legal document aimed to 
reflect and dramatize deep social feelings about the value and validity of the law.  In 
turn, religion maintains a legal dimension, an inner structure of legality, which gives 
religious lives and religious communities their coherence, order, and social form.  Legal 
“habits of the heart” structure the inner spiritual life and discipline of religious believers, 
from the reclusive hermit to the aggressive zealot.  Legal ideas of justice, order, dignity, 
atonement, restitution, responsibility, obligation, and others pervade the theological 
doctrines of countless religious traditions.  Legal structures and processes continue to 
organize and govern religious communities and their distinctive beliefs and rituals, 
mores and morals.  Without religion, law decays into empty formalism; without law, 
religion decays into shallow spiritualism.4 
In this chapter -- dedicated to Professor Welker with great admiration, 
appreciation, and affection – I explore a bit the role of metaphor theory as an additional 
“truth-seeking” and “trust building” bridge between the fields of law and religion.  This 
has not been a topic that Professor Welker and I have discussed.  Much of the high-
flying metaphor theory in print is several octaves above my usual low pitch as a legal 
historian.  But I have learned just enough about this theory from our late great friend, 
Don Browning, to see some of its power and potential as a further methodological 
bridge builder between law and religion discussions. And, I have learned just enough 
about “integrative jurisprudence” from my late great mentor, Harold J. Berman, to think 
that metaphor theory might help with integrating legal and religious discourse a bit 
further, thereby further “building trust” and “reducing risk” of misunderstanding across 
these two great disciplines.  Hence these necessarily preliminary and experimental 
thoughts below.5    
 
3 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964). 
4 Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1974). 
5 I have been discussing this topic with my friend and colleague, Rafael Domingo, and have benefitted 
greatly from his recent God and the Secular Legal System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016) and his unpublished ms., “Body, Soul, and Spirit of the Law: Towards a Holistic Legal Paradigm.” 
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Metaphors and Meaning 
Modern cognitive theorists have shown that our conceptual thought and everyday 
speech are riddled with metaphors that help us to make sense of our experiences.6 The 
metaphors they have in mind are not only the clever images, similes, fictions, and 
analogies of the poets and playwrights: “the ship of state”; “your mind is a machine”; 
“time heals all wounds”; “necessity is the mother of invention”; “thou hast cleft my heart 
in twain.”7  Nor do they mean just the colloquialisms of common speech: “I smell a rat” 
or “that idea stinks.”  These kinds of word games are everywhere in our language, and 
have long been recognized.  Modern cognitive theorists are interested not just in these 
word games but also in the metaphors that run deeper, sometimes unseen, yet shape 
our thought and language.  “The essence of metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another,” write noted cognitive theorists 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their path-breaking study Metaphors We Live By.8 
Orientation and Structural Metaphors.  Some of these are what cognitive 
theorists call orientation metaphors. Think of how much conceptual and linguistic work 
we do with the simple spatial image of up and down.  “Up” is generally more positive, 
“down” more negative in our mind and speech.  “Things are looking up.” “Thumbs up.” 
“We hit our peak last year.  “I’m feeling up today.”  “I’m in high spirits.”  “That boosted 
my spirits.” “My spirits rose.”  By contrast: “I’m feeling down.”  “My spirits sank.”  “I’m 
really low.” “I’m depressed.”  I’m in a rut.”  “It all been downhill of late.”  “Even though I 
walk through the valley of the shadow of death.”9  We draw the same set of contrasts 
with other spatial images.  Think of “front-back,” “on-off,” “in-out,” “near-far,” “center-
edge,” and how much they coat our thought and speech.  We do the same thing with 
other kinds of common contrasts in nature: “light-dark,” “day-night,” “summer-winter” 
and more.  It’s “the winter of our discontent made glorious summer” -- not the other way 
around.  All these orientation metaphors allow us to tie our language and thought to 
common objects of our experience.10  
Some of our language and thought is also shaped by deeper structural 
metaphors.  These kinds of metaphors do more conceptual work, but often more subtly, 
sometimes subconsciously.  Lakoff and Johnson give a good example: “Argument is 
war.”  That’s not something we normally say or hear in everyday speech – save perhaps 
in a tough crash course on negotiation, a military command center, or a bruising 
government budget battle.  Yet, this structural metaphor quietly produces all kinds of 
common images in our mind and turns of phrase in our everyday speech about 
arguments:  
 
6 See Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny 
(London: Routledge, 2003). 
7 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 4. 
8 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, The Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), 5. 
9 Psalm 23:4. 
10 Lakoff and Johnson, The Metaphors We Live By, 14-24. 
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Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument.   
His criticisms were right on target.  
I demolished his argument.   
I’ve never won an argument with him.   
You disagree? Okay shoot.   
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.  
He shot down all of my arguments.11 
 
Obviously, an argument is not a form of war.  But the concept of an argument is 
“metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and consequently 
the language is metaphorically structured” as a war.12   
Once the structural metaphor, “argument is war,” gets pointed out, it’s easy to 
see how it shapes our everyday language and habits of thought.  And, once explored 
and illustrated, the metaphor might well bring nods of approval by some -- say, a hard-
nosed litigator whose livelihood depends on winning “courtroom battles.”  It may bring 
frowns to others, like psychologists, mediators, or pastors, who use words to promote 
healing conversation or spiritual elevation.  For them, the image of “argument is war” 
and the common phrases it inspires impedes their cause.  They know that “fire away!” is 
not a good way to start a mediation or healing session.  But for many of us who are “just 
arguing” about mundane things in everyday life we often subconsciously carry on with 
the linguistic artillery of warfare.  That might help explain a bit why we sometimes can’t 
stop the argument until we “win”; losers in “war” rarely fare well.  But the metaphor itself 
-- “argument is war” -- often remains hidden, unacknowledged, while it quietly shapes 
our everyday thought and language.  
Take another example of a structural metaphor: “Time is money.”  This 
metaphor, too, spins off all kind of habits of thought and speech we use every day: 
You’re wasting my time. 
This gadget will save you hours 
I don’t have the time to give you. 
How do you spend your time these days? 
That flat tire cost me an hour. 
I’ve invested a lot of time in her.  
I don’t have enough time to spare for that. 
You’re running out of time. 
You need to budget your time. 
Is that worth your while? 
Do you have much time left? 
He’s living on borrowed time. 
You don’t use your time profitably. 
 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid., 5-6. 
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I’ve lost a lot of time when I got sick. 
Thank you for your time.13 
 
In this metaphor, we’ve taken something infinite – time -- and have not only 
divided it, but commodified it into something limited, valuable, and calculable.  In a 
Western services market, this is a good way to do our billing and accounting, and it 
certainly helps to schedule appointments and airlines.  But the reality is that the “time is 
money” metaphor, at least in the West, has saturated our everyday speech, even when 
quantifying or calculating hours and minutes is not important or is counterproductive.  
Contrast that Western metaphor of “time is money,” say, to the images of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan who say that “time is a gift,” and declare defiantly to the occupying 
American forces: “You have the watches, we have the time.”14 
The “time is money” metaphor brings to mind all kinds of other metaphors of the 
market and the economy that pepper and spice our speech: “Labor is capital.” “Markets 
must be free.” “Every man has his price.”  “It’s a dog-eat-dog world out there.”  Even in 
the world of economics that deals in hard numbers, metaphors are hard at work shaping 
our thought and language.  We anthropomorphize the market into an agent and object, 
and describe its activities with our familiar orientation metaphors of up and down. “The 
market fell today.”  “The Dow plummeted.”  “Coke inched back up.”  “GM fought its way 
back.” “NASDAQ leaped forward.”  We root for the market as if we were watching our 
children from the sidelines of a ballgame -- having “invested” in both.  Sometimes we 
make the market an object, often a victim, of the actions of others: “That new regulation 
just strangled the market.”  “The dollar’s fall killed GM this quarter.”  “The Fed’s lower 
interest rate gave the Dow new life.”  What’s interesting for our purposes is that “the 
stock market is one place where communicators strive for practical precision rather than 
inspiring poetry,” but here, too, metaphors work subtly to shape our thought, language, 
and practice.15   
Ontological and Religious Metaphors.  Even deeper than orientation and 
structural metaphors are what cognitive theorists call ontological metaphors. These are 
more fundamental beliefs, values, and ideals that shape not only our thought and 
language but our whole intellectual and institutional orientation.  Sometimes these deep 
ontological metaphors are cast in poetic language.  “Man is free, but everywhere in 
chains.”16  “These are the times that try men’s souls.”17  “The Constitution has erected a 
high and impregnable wall between church and state.”18 “Law is the bulwark of 
 
13 Ibid., 7-8. 
14 Newsweek (October 10 & 17, 2011), 62. 
15 M.W. Morris et al., “Metaphors and the Market: Consequences and Preconditions of Agent and Object 
Metaphors in Stock Market Commentary,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102 
(2007): 174-192.  
16 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, and Other Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), bk. 1, chap. 1, sec. 1, p. 41. 
17 Thomas Paine, Common Sense and the Crisis (New York: Doubleday, 1960), __. 
18 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
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freedom.”19  Sometimes these ontological metaphors are plainer statements but with no 
less meaning-making and institution-shaping power:  “All men are created equal.”  “No 
taxation without representation.”  “One man, one vote.”  “Popular sovereignty.”  
“Freedom!”20    
In politics, these deeper ontological metaphors – whether poetically or plainly 
stated -- can become veritable articles of faith, which we cherish, even adore, which we 
fight for, even to death.  During the American Revolution, these ontological metaphors 
were clearly stated as articles of faith grounded in “the laws of nature and nature’s 
God.” “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.” These founding 
statements were eventually wrapped in bright patriotic colors and ceremonies, statues 
and songs that could not be missed as articles of a common political faith.  In the Cold 
War, they were recast as “spiritual weapons” in the struggle of “freedom versus 
communism,” “Godly America versus atheist Russia.”21  In the war on terror, they were 
pitched as a “crusade for freedom” against the “axis of evil,” the “clash of civilizations” 
between the West and the rest.22   
But ontological metaphors in politics, or in other fields, don’t have to be so high-
flying, so obvious, so revolutionary to inspire followers, or to shape actions, allegiances, 
and institutional activities reflexively.  The great American church historian Martin Marty 
tells the funny but poignant story of “an incident in which visitors came upon a tarred-
and-feathered refugee as he ran away from the up-in-arms citizenry of a small town.  
Asked what had led him to this terrible treatment, he declared that an argument had 
arisen about the Monroe Doctrine and his attitude toward it…. He said he believed in 
the Monroe Doctrine, he lived by the Monroe Doctrine, he would die for the Monroe 
Doctrine; he just did not know what was in it.”23  The point is that it’s not just soldiers, 
duty-bound to obey commands, whose activities and attitudes can be reflexively shaped 
by ontological metaphors that express deep ideals of “freedom,” “democracy,” or 
“patriotism.”  It’s often the followers, the crowds, who will join a cause reflexively, often 
knowing little more than the guiding maxim, the statement of belief, the ontological 
metaphor, of the movement to spur them to dramatic action.  “Corporations are greedy” 
was enough to stoke the WTO riots and Occupy Wall Street movement.  “Management 
is corrupt” has inspired many a labor strike.  “Save the rainforest” brings out the greens 
and greenbacks by the millions.  It does not matter whether these claims are true, 
 
19 Milner S. Ball, Lying Down Together: Law, Metaphor, and Theology (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985), 23, 143, quoting James Madison, Lord Denning and others. 
20 See the collection of American founding statements in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., The 
Founders’ Constitution, 5 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
21 See T. Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forming of an American National 
Religion (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009). 
22 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Shuster Paperbacks, 2011).   
23 Martin E. Marty, “Foreword,” to Modern Christian Teachings on Law, Politics, and Human Nature, ed. 
John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), xvi (citing D.W. 
Brogan).   
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verified, rational, or justified.  Eventually, their mere statement is enough to spur 
allegiance and action among many. 
As these examples illustrate, ontological metaphors run deeper than structural 
metaphors.  “Deeper” in the sense that they don’t just subtly shape thoughts and words; 
they also inspire attitudes and actions of greater magnitude.  “Deeper” in that they 
sometimes concern fundamental or ultimate beliefs or values in life, things for which 
people make ample sacrifices of time, talent, and treasure – things that people will die 
for.  “Deeper” in that these ontological metaphors sometimes command major 
allegiances and alliances – literally, on the battlefields and streets, virtually in the 
communities of ideas and conversation that gather around them.   
Viewed at this deeper level, ontological metaphors can become like religious 
metaphors.  Not all ontological metaphors are religious.  But an ontological metaphor – 
and the attitudes and actions, allegiances and alliances it inspires – becomes religious if 
it is based on subjective beliefs and assumptions about the underlying features of 
experience and reality, and if it involves a cognitive leap, an act of trust or reliance that 
goes beyond immediate sense experience or the experimentally replicable procedures 
of science.  In taking this leap or relying on this hunch, it takes on the character of faith, 
becoming at least “quasi-religious.”  Often this is done today when, say, Marxism, 
market capitalism, liberal democracy, cultural individualism, or therapeutic ideologies 
provide life orientations and directions for individuals and groups.24  The ontological 
metaphor becomes more fully religious in character when it gets expressed in and 
through ceremonies and rituals, statements of belief, canons of conduct, and 
communities of followers – as we see in some modern forms of secular nationalism. 
To call these ontological metaphors “religious” or “quasi-religious” is not to 
deprecate or defame them.  It’s rather to show that they shape attitudes and actions, 
allegiances and alliances much like religious metaphors shape the same in Christians 
and other religious believers.  “Profit is the measure of right” is no less a galvanizing 
creedal statement than “Do unto other as you would have done unto you.”  “Man is free” 
shapes allegiances and alliances as much as “God is sovereign.”  “Marriage is a mere 
contract” is no less a fundamental statement of belief and value than “marriage is a 
sacrament.” 
With this broad understanding of metaphor as our guide, we can see that many 
schools of thought and action and many cognitive activities are religious or quasi-
religious in character. They build on and produce faith-like hunches about the most 
determinative context of experience and either imply or are further animated by 
storylines about the whence and whether of reality as a whole.  Political historians and 
philosophers have long shown how modern nationalism is a form of secular religion 
rooted in deep political metaphors.  This same phenomenon can be seen in the world of 
 
24 For a fuller discussion of this view of religious metaphors, see Don Browning and Terry Cooper, 
Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 21-30, 106-
143, 203-209. 
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ideas.  In Evolution as a Religion, Mary Midgley shows how many scientists and other 
academics embrace the metaphor of evolution not only as an explanatory concept but 
also a quasi-religious belief about the origin and nature of reality.  For them, old-
fashioned talk of a “creation order,” “natural law,” or “teleological structure” is not just 
unscientific, but anathema, a form of irrationality to be exorcised from the academy.25 In 
Economics as Religion, Robert Nelson exposes the faith-like economic beliefs and 
actions of various rational-choice, behavioral, and institutional economics schools at 
work today.  In these competing schools of economic thought, Nelson finds differing 
quasi-religious models of what is basic to experience, what can be trusted, and what 
can be expected in the future.  Among some economists, Nelson shows, “cost-benefit 
analysis” is as devout a belief and liturgical an activity as “praying for our daily bread.”26  
Similarly, in Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies, Don Browning and Terry 
Cooper have exposed the quasi-religious metaphors that animate the major modern 
psychologies.  Deep metaphors of life against death, harmony, care, and teleological 
design anchor their thought, and inspire major schools of psychological thought and 
therapeutic service that still operate all over the West and well beyond.27 
Metaphors and the Law   
Having seen orientation, structural, ontological, and even quasi-religious 
metaphors at work in many other fields of study -- even technical fields like science and 
economics -- it should come as no surprise to find metaphors at work in law, too. 
Despite its popular reputation for being bound by neutral logic, exacting reason, and 
scientific rigor, law is in fact filled with metaphorical reasoning and rhetoric.  And the 
legal system as a whole rests on deep ontological metaphors that reflect fundamental 
beliefs and subjective values of the people and their rulers.   
Orientation and Structural Metaphors.  A number of metaphors at work in the 
law are orientation and structural metaphors.  Many of them are based on 
personifications of the law, metaphors mapped onto the body and its parts.  Jurists 
speak of the “body” the “corpus” of the law -- the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the Corpus Iuris 
Canonici, the Corpus Iuris Hibernici. This “body” of the law is sometimes depicted in a 
gendered way as “Lady Justice” -- Justitia and Dike, the ancient Romans and Greeks 
called her, respectively and respectfully. The law, jurists say, has both an “anatomy” 
and a “physiology” -- a structure and form as well as a process, procedure, and proper 
way of functioning.28  It also has a “heart,” “soul,” and “spirit”—reflected in the concern 
 
25 Mary Midgley, Evolution as a Religion (London: Methuen, 1985). 
26 Robert Nelson, Economics and Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (University Park, 
PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). 
27 Browning and Cooper, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies. 
28 See Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (New York: Praeger, 1968); Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. 
Sacks, The Legal Process, ed. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey (Westbury, NY: Foundation 
Press, 1994).  See other examples in Domingo, “Body, Soul, and Spirit of the Law.” 
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for both the letter and spirit of the law.29  The law “embodies” important principles like 
“due process,” into which are further “incorporated” (from “corpus,” Latin for “body”) 
various rights in the Bill of Rights.  The body of the law grows, matures, and senesces; 
some of its members eventually die and become “dead letters.”  But even then, some of 
these dead members “long buried,” like the old forms of actions at English common law, 
“still rule us from their graves.”30   
Citizens and subjects are “bound” by the law, and the private contracts made 
between parties are likewise “binding.”  Criminals “break” the law, “harm” the “body 
politic,” “tear the social fabric.”  Thus “the long arm of the law” reaches out to bring them 
to justice.  An important new case is a “seminal” case.  The later cases it “spawns” are 
its “progeny.”  Constitutional courts “strike” down statutes “on their face.”  Corporations 
are “legal bodies,” “fictitious persons,” capable of “corporate speech” and “corporate 
crime.”  Busy lawyers call the law “a jealous mistress” and call themselves “slaves” to 
their time sheets.  Lawyers “stand” at the bar, on behalf of clients whose cases are 
“live.” Judges “sit” on these cases and preside over the ritualized “battles” of the 
courtroom, which open with “pleadings” to the judge, followed by the ritualized “motions” 
and “counter-motions” of the opposing parties.  Each side then “attacks” the other with 
“lines of argument” arrayed as if soldiers on a march, with one side “winning” and 
collecting the spoils, the “damages,” inflicted on the other.31  
As soon as you let your imagination run this way, all kinds of such structural 
metaphors of the law come to mind.  Think of trees: the law has “roots,” “branches,” 
“ripe cases,” specialized “fields.”  Think of rivers: we have “streams of commerce,” 
“downstream effects” of decisions, “watershed” cases or statutes, and new laws drawn 
out of “deep wells.”  Think of mountains: we have “high principles” and “lowly precepts”; 
we have “slippery slopes” and “dangerous passes” that should not be risked.  Think of 
“paths”:  Rabbis speak of “the way” or “path of the law” (Halacha); Justinian regarded 
“the legal remedy as a path” to peace and order.  Think of light: important cases are 
“fixed stars in the universe” and important legal tomes and codes are the “windows” or 
“mirrors” (Spiegelen) of law. And on and on we could go.  
Some of these legal metaphors are simply rhetorical tropes or shorthands to 
stoke the imagination or to win over the non-lawyer sitting, say, in the jury box or the 
 
29 See Martin E. Marty, “The Religious Foundations of the Law,” Emory Law Journal 54 (2005): 291-324, 
with responses by Frank S. Alexander, Timothy P. Terrell, and Paul J. Zwier, in Emory Law Journal 54 
(2005): 325-375. 
30 F.W. Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1909), 296, quoted and discussed in Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and 
Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 335-336. 
31 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, 336-39; id., “Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and 
the Cognitive Stakes for Law,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 137 (1989): 1105-1237; id., “The 
Metaphor of Standing and Self-Government,” Stanford Law Review 40 (1988): 1371.  See also Mark 
Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reasoning (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What 
Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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voting booth.  Think of how the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor brings alive one 
version of free speech doctrines or how “the wall of separation” image captures one 
ideal of church-state relations.  Sometimes these metaphors are “condensed codes”32 
designed to communicate legal complexity with simplicity and efficiency. “Having one’s 
day in court” nicely captures a whole array of important legal doctrines and procedures 
and constitutional rights.  Giving “marital equality” to gays and lesbians is a nice 
rhetorical shorthand for a whole body of learning about privacy, equality, autonomy, 
non-discrimination, and self-determination as well as about the nature and purpose of 
marriage itself.  
Ontological and Religious Metaphors.  But in law, metaphors are more than 
linguistic tools and rhetorical tropes.  They are also designed to help make objective 
and tangible the deep subjective ideals and beliefs that we hold dear as legal 
authorities, legal subjects, and legal professionals.  These metaphors help us to create 
enduring legal order and meaningful legal norms – norms that are understandable, 
acceptable, commanding of obedience, and enforceable in a community.33  As the late 
Yale legal philosopher Robert Cover put it: 
Creation of legal meaning … requires not only the movement 
of dedication and commitment, but also the objectification of 
that to which one is committed.  The community posits a law, 
external to itself, that it is committed to obeying and that it 
does obey in dedication to its understanding of that law.  
Objectification is crucial to the language games that can be 
played with the law to the meanings that can be created out 
of it…. Creation of legal meaning entails, then, subjective 
commitment to an objective understanding of a demand.  It 
entails the disengagement of the self from the “object” of law, 
and at the same time requires an engagement to that object 
as a faithful “other.”34 
 
In saying this, Cover “strips lawmaking down to its roots in human thought and action,” 
and “rip[s] away the veil of objectivity and rationality that attends the most conventional 
 
32 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 24, 
quoted and discussed with reference to the family in Robert N. Bellah, “Marriage in the Matrix of Habit 
and History,” in Family Transformed: Religion, Society, and Values in American Life, ed. Steven M. Tipton 
and John Witte, Jr. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 21-33. 
33 See Robert M. Cover, “Violence and the Word,” Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1601 on the necessary 
coercive quality of these binding norms.  See further Robert M. Cover, Narrative, Violence, and the Law: 
The Essays of Robert Cover, ed. Martha L. Minow, Michael Ryan, Austin Sarat (Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan Press, 1992). 
34 Robert M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative: The Supreme Court 1982 Term,” Harvard Law Review 97 
(1983): 4-68, at 45.    
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judicial and academic expositions of the law” as a closed system of auto-generated and 
self-executing rules and procedures.35   
Cover’s insight captures but goes beyond the insights of the American legal 
realists in the 1930s and 40s, who showed persuasively that judges render their 
judgments not merely by formal legal logic and ineluctable legal reasoning, but just as 
much in expression of their passions, prejudices, experiences, and ideals.36  It also 
goes beyond the more cynical charges of various critical legal scholars who, since the 
1960s, have claimed that law is simply an instrument for the rich and powerful to exploit 
the poor, needy, and vulnerable, and to impose coercively on the community their ideals 
of class, gender, race, religion, economy, social hierarchy, and more.37 For Cover, the 
realists and “crits” were right in exposing the reality that law is not the closed system of 
formal rules and procedures that the dominant schools of legal positivism of their day 
were teaching law students. They were right to show that beneath the objective patina 
of the law, beneath its claims of purported neutrality and pure rationality, there are 
fundamental subjective beliefs, ideals, and values, deep ontological metaphors, that for 
better or worse drive legislation, adjudication, and executive administration of the law.  
But this reality is a not a betrayal of the rule of law, Cover insists.  To the contrary, the 
law needs that process of objectifying the subjective, of reifying certain ideas, values, 
and beliefs, in order to be enduring and effective, and to be binding on citizens and 
officials alike.  
The key to the legitimacy of a legal order is for the people and their rulers alike to 
be aware of this reality.  They must be aware that the purportedly objective rules and 
procedures of the law are rooted in deep subjective choices, even if those choices 
remain hidden from day-to-day legal and communal life. They must be aware that these 
deep subjective choices reflect and reify fundamental beliefs and values, deep 
ontological metaphors, about the meanings and measures of authority and liberty, 
justice and mercy, rule and equity, nature and custom, canon and commandment, and 
more.  They must be able, when a major crisis and challenge comes, to bring to light 
these fundamental beliefs, to inspect them, and, if necessary, to reform them or the 
particular rules and procedures that these beliefs and metaphors once inspired.  And 
the people and their rulers must be aware that these fundamental beliefs, and the 
decisions about whether and how to reform them, are situated in and guided by ongoing 
communal narratives about the meaning of life and reality altogether.  Cover put it 
memorably:   
We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe.  We constantly create and 
maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and 
void…. No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
 
35 Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, 334. 
36 See, e.g., William W. Fisher, Morton J. Horwitz, and Thomas Reed, American Legal Realism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). 
37 See, e.g., David Kairys, ed., Politics and the Law: A Progressive Critique, rev. ed. (New York: Pantheon 
Books 1990). 
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narratives that locate it and give it meaning.  For every constitution, there 
is an epic, for every decalogue a scripture.  Once understood in the 
context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a 
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.38 
Metaphor theory, understood this way, has long been a favorite of Western legal 
historians as they have sought to describe the foundational ideology or belief-system of 
a legal civilization or age and the major forms and norms of its predominant legal 
system.  In recounting the history of the law, these historians ask: What are the 
dominant beliefs and values, myths and metaphors that inform this legal system?  What 
happens to this legal system when those myths and metaphors change, especially 
abruptly through conquest or revolution?  The American poet and Harvard Law School 
graduate, Archibald MacLeish, captures this notion in his poem, The Metaphor: 
A legal age becomes an age, all else beside, 
When sensuous poets in their pride invent, 
Emblems for the soul's content. 
That speaks the meanings men will never know 
But man-imagined images can show. 
It perishes when those images, though seen, 
No longer mean.39 
Harold J. Berman offers a splendid example of viewing the history of Western law 
through shifts in its ontological metaphors, or its founding “belief systems,” as he called 
them. There is a distinct Western legal tradition, Berman argues, a set of legal ideas 
and institutions that has evolved by accretion and adaptation over the centuries.  Six 
great revolutions, however, have punctuated its gradual evolution: the Papal Revolution 
of 1075, the German Lutheran Revolution of 1517, the English Puritan Revolution of 
1640, and the American, French, and Russian Revolutions of 1776, 1789, and 1917.  
These revolutions were, in part, rebellions against a legal and political order that had 
become outmoded and ossified, arbitrary and abusive.  But, more fundamentally, these 
revolutions were products of radical shifts in the founding metaphors, in the dominant 
belief-systems of the people.   
Each of these new belief systems offered a new eschatology and a new 
apocalyptic vision of the perfect end-time, whether that be the second coming of Christ, 
the arrival of the heavenly city of the Enlightenment philosophers, or the withering away 
of the state.  Each of these revolutions triggered massive changes in prevailing legal 
 
38 Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 4-5.  For comparative perspectives along comparable lines, see Lior 
Barshak, “Constituent Power as Body: Outline of a Constitutional Theology,” University of Toronto Law 
Journal 56 (2006): 185; Kjell Ǻ Modéer, “Lebende Ruinen de Rechts: Rechtliche Metaphern in 
postkoloniel und spätmodernen Rechtskulturdiskursen,” Rechtsgeschichte 19 (2011): 228 and elaboration 
in Lisbet Christoffersen, Kjell Ǻ Modéer, Svend Andersen, eds., Law & Religion in the 21st Century – 
Nordic Perspectives (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 2010). 
39 Quoted by Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), v. 
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forms and norms -- movements from canon law to civil law to common law, from the 
supremacy of the church, to the supremacy of the state, to the supremacy of the 
individual and the collective.  Each of these revolutions, in its radical phase, sought the 
death of an old legal order to bring forth a new order that would survive its 
understanding of the Last Judgment.  Eventually, each of these revolutions settled down 
and introduced fundamental legal changes that were ultimately subsumed in and 
accommodated to the Western legal tradition. Today, Berman concludes, this Western 
legal tradition has been drawn into increasing cooperation and competition with other 
legal traditions from around the globe, in the struggle to define a new common law, a 
new legal language for the emerging world order.40   
Berman’s account of law and religion in Western history built on earlier European 
scholarship.  Nineteenth-century German jurists Friedrich Carl von Savigny and Otto 
von Gierke, for example, offered a quite different account of Western legal history based 
on shifting images of the individual and the collective, the Volk and the Volksgeist, the 
citizen and the association (Genossenschaft).  English legal historian Sir Henry Maine 
depicted millennium-long shifts in the Western legal tradition from status to contract, 
from equity to legislation, from custom to code.  Dutch philosopher Herman 
Dooyeweerd analyzed the founding and grounding “religious motifs” or metaphors of 
each age -- the motifs of Greek “form and matter,” Catholic “grace and nature,” 
Protestant “creation, fall, and redemption,” and Enlightenment “nature and freedom” and 
the concrete manifestations of these shifting motifs in legal, political, and cultural life.  
Legal scholars have used metaphor theory not only to describe the founding 
metaphors or beliefs of whole legal systems in different historical eras, but also to 
describe discrete bodies of law in operation today.  Constitutional law is a favorite for 
metaphorical treatment.  A number of legal scholars have shown that, for many 
Americans, constitutionalism is a fundamental cultural activity that sometimes takes on 
overt religious qualities.41  The Constitution is viewed as a sacred national document, 
secured in a national shrine, celebrated in national holidays and exhibitions, and 
confirmed in solemn oaths and pledges of allegiance.  The text of the Constitution is 
authoritative in itself, a canon whose exact meaning remains the subject of endless 
debate and development. The writings of the founding fathers who created and ratified 
this document are also authoritative – like Prophets expounding the Torah, Epistles 
glossing the Gospels. The judges who interpret the Constitution are secular priests, 
 
40 See ibid.; Berman, Faith and Order; id., Law and Language: Effective Symbols of Community, ed. John 
Witte, Jr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  See analysis in Howard O. Hunter, The 
Integrative Jurisprudence of Harold J. Berman (Boulder/London: Westview Press, 1996); Symposium, 
“The Foundations of Law,” Emory Law Journal 54 (2005): 1-375; Lior Barshak, “The Communal Body, 
The Corporate Body, and the Clerical Body:  An Anthropological Reading of the Gregorian Reform, in 
Sacred and Secular in Early Modern Cultures: New Essays, ed. Lawrence Besserman (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 101. 
41 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jack 
Balkin and W. Sanford Levinson, Legal Canons (New York: NYU Press, 2000); Paul W. Kahn, The 
Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); 
id., Political Theology: Four New Chapters in the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011). 
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who, after enduring long passages of ordination and confirmation, utter solemn public 
oaths to uphold the Constitution.42  Like priests standing at their high pulpits expounding 
the biblical commandment to “love thy neighbor as thyself,” judges sit on their raised 
benches expounding the constitutional commandment to give “due process” and “equal 
protection” to all.43 Like congregants in the church, citizens of the state study these 
priestly interpretations of their authoritative text, debating their veracity, their utility, their 
allegiance to the original and evolving meaning of the canon.   
It’s easy to get lofty like this in describing the quasi-religious ontological and 
structural metaphors of constitutional law, since this topic morphs into some of the 
quasi-religious political metaphors that we sampled above.  But other legal subjects – 
criminal law, torts, contracts, bankruptcy, evidence, corporations, environmental law, 
human rights law, and the like – have equally profound, albeit usually more prosaic 
beliefs, values, and ideals that shape them.  Deep notions of fault and responsibility are 
at work in torts and criminal law.  The meaning of promises, faithfulness, and reliability 
animates the law of contracts.  Redemption and forgiveness are at the core of 
bankruptcy law. Testimony and truth-seeking are at the heart of evidence law.  Profit 
and accountability are among the founding beliefs of corporate law.  Nature and its 
preservation are at the core of modern environmental law.  Human dignity and its 
protection are at the foundation of modern human rights law.44  The founding norms and 
beliefs of these legal specialties don’t usually get as grandly ritualized and celebrated as 
those of constitutional law – although environmental law and human rights do 
sometimes inspire marches and demonstrations, canons and declarations, platforms 
and associations that attract large numbers of spirited devotees.45  But even if not, the 
founding ontological metaphors and beliefs at work in many specialty areas of law today 
remain deeply held, fervently believed, and reflexively implemented.  In that sense, they 
are what I have called quasi-religious metaphors.  
“Trinitarian” Metaphors in the Study of Law?  
And now let me hazard a speculative idea, which I hope Professor Welker will 
accept as a genuinely open query: could the (quasi-)religious dimensions of metaphors 
in law also be reflected in part in the prevalent use of numbers that are considered 
special or even sacred in a culture.  Nearly half a millennium ago, the great English 
jurist, Sir Edward Coke took note of how often the “sacred number twelve” came up in 
the law, beginning with the “Twelve Tables” of ancient Roman law: 
 
42 W. Tarver Rountree, “Constitutionalism as the American Religion: The Good Portion,” Emory Law 
Journal 39 (1990): 203-216. 
43 Jaroslav Pelikan, Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2004). 
44 See examples in John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and Law: An Introduction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
45 See examples in John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and Human Rights: An 
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and John Witte, Jr. and M. Christian Green, 
Religion and Human Rights: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
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It seemeth to me that the Law in this case delighteth herself 
in the number of twelve.  For there must not onley be 12 jurors 
for the tryall of matters of fact, but 12 judges of ancient time 
for the tryall of matters of law in the Exchequer Chamber.  Also 
for matters of State, there were in ancient time 12 Counsellors 
of State.  He that wageth his law, must have eleven others 
with him, which thinke hee sayes true.  And that number of 
twelve is much respected in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 
stones, 12 tribes, etc.46 
A number of scholars have also pointed to the “special mystical value” attached 
to the number three in ancient systems of belief and law.  “To many of the leading 
nations of antiquity it represented divine power,” writes leading Roman law historian, 
Henry Goudy, in a fascinating older study on Trichotomy in Roman Law.  “As evidence 
of this it is enough to refer to the three Gods of Hindu mythology – Vishnu, Siva, and 
Brahma, and the Trinity of Christian doctrine.  By some ancient philosophers, it [three] 
was regarded as the most symbolic of numbers, because it represented the beginning, 
middle, and end of all things, and also the dimensions of space.”47  This appetite for 
triads appears similarly in numerous ancient legal doctrines.  Goudy explores a score of 
them at the heart of Roman law: the division of all law into ius naturale, ius gentium, and 
ius civile; the main division of civil law into actions, persons, and things; the aphorism 
that all laws are concerned with the acquisition, conservation, and restriction of rights; 
the division of legal persons into liberi, servi, et libertini; the three marks of justice being 
honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, and suum cuique tribuere; the three forms of 
government as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and much more.  This appetite 
for triads, for three-ness persists in many more recent legal doctrines, too.48  Modern 
jurists speak regularly of life, liberty and property; liberté, equalité, fraternité; three 
generations of human rights; three purposes of punishment, retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation; three forms of legal power, executive, legislative, and judicial; three 
purposes of legislation, health, safety, and welfare; the body, soul, and spirit of the law, 
and more.  Some jurists strive to integrate the three civil, theological, and educational 
uses of the law and the three legal schools of natural law, legal positivism, and historical 
jurisprudence.   
So why the persistence of the number “three” as we think both functionally and 
foundationally about the law and our human interaction with it?  Is “three” just an easy 
trope for presentation and memory?  Is it just an organizational or “orientation 
metaphor”?  Does it just connote the sense of basic balance that we three-dimensional 
human beings crave?  Is it just akin to what gardeners tell us about planting flowers, 
trees, and bushes -- that clusters of three together are usually seen as the most 
harmonious and balanced?  Maybe that is all that is involved here.   
 
46 Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Lawes of England, Part I, bk. 2, ch. 12, sec. 234. 
47 Henry Goudy, Trichotomy in Roman Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910), 8-10.  
48 Ibid., 20-72. 
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But the Trinitarian Christian in me wonders whether there might be something 
deeper at work that drives this appetite for triads in law, as in life.  In our creeds and 
confessions, we say that it was the Triune God who announced at creation: “Let us 
make man in our image, after our likeness.”49  As image-bearers of God, humans thus 
ultimately bear God’s triune image.  We reflect these Trinitarian views in our 
anthropologies of body, soul, and spirit; of reason, will, and memory; of prophet, priest, 
and king; of faith, hope, and love.  If we humans are created as Trinitarian beings, 
perhaps it is inevitable that the laws that we create, rooted as they are in the Triune God 
who gave us law, should reflect some of these Trinitarian dimensions as well.  
That’s a big claim, and one that I want to try to think and work through in the 
years ahead, hopefully in conversation if not collaboration with Professor Welker.  He is, 
after all, working on the last volume of his trilogy on the Trinitarian Godhead – on God 
the just and righteous.  What will be interesting to discover is whether an integrative 
Trinitarian jurisprudence can be built akin to the integrative Trinitarian theology that has 
been worked out over the centuries; and whether St. Paul’s metaphor of the “body, soul, 
and spirit” of the human person might be a useful metaphor for centering an integrated 
theory of the “body, soul, and spirit” of human laws.  This would be a rather new way of 
thinking about law and religion, and more specifically law and Christianity.  It might well 
build better “trust” between jurists and theologians than is reflected in Luther’s famous 
quip, “Juristen böse Christen.”  I don’t know enough yet to speculate further here, but I 
suspect Professor Welker will have a lot to say about this topic.  I won’t be just holding 
him “up my sleeve” as Butterfield did with his favorite German scholar; I will be sitting at 
his feet, eager to learn more from him.   
 
49 Genesis 1:27.   
